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Abstract
This paper presents an experiment on learning in repeated games, which
complements the analysis of players' actual choices with data on the infor-
mation acquisition process they follow. Subjects play a repeated Cournot
oligopoly, with limited a priori information. The econometrics hinges on a
model built upon Experience Weighted Attraction learning, and the simul-
taneous analysis of data on the information gathered and on actions taken
by the subjects. Results suggest that learning is a composite process, in
which diﬀerent components coexist. Adaptive learning emerges as the lead-
ing element, but when subjects look at the strategies individually adopted by
their competitors they tend to imitate the most successful behavior, which
makes markets more competitive. Reinforcement learning also plays a role,
as subjects favor strategies that have yielded higher proﬁts in the past.
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1. Introduction
What happens when the information required to ﬁnd out and adopt the
equilibrium behavior is concealed, and its acquisition and processing is dif-
ﬁcult or costly? The present study aims at contributing to the quest for an
answer to this long debated question, by tackling this problem through an
experiment on a repeated Cournot oligopoly game with strict informational
constraints. We investigate how subjects learn to play, by monitoring at the
same time what they do and what information they look for.
The debate on learning in oligopoly was opened by Vega-Redondo (1997),
who developed an original idea by Schaﬀer (1989) and proposed a theoretical
model of behavior of Cournot oligopolists. His model shows that Walrasian
behavior can emerge in the long run within any Cournot oligopoly with ho-
mogeneous goods, if ﬁrms tend to imitate the behavior that in the previous
period proved most successful among their competitors (that is, they produce
the level of output that yielded the highest proﬁt) but with positive prob-
ability experiment with other strategies. In a number of subsequent works
Vega Redondo's theory has been experimentally tested and compared with
other learning models that make diﬀerent assumptions about players' infor-
mation and lead to diﬀerent behaviors and market equilibria.1 The results
of these studies, however, are not completely unanimous, nor fully decisive.
1See for example Huck et al. (1999), Rassenti et al. (2000), Oﬀerman et al. (2002)
and Bosch-Domènech and Vriend (2003). More recently, further experiments on Vega-
Redondo's imitation model have been conducted by Apesteguia et al. (2007, 2010), but
these experiments were not framed as oligopolies.
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The question of how learning works in this and similar settings is still open
and deserves further investigation.
The main purpose of the present work is to tackle the problem of learning
in experimental oligopolies with a novel approach, which consists of combin-
ing the study of how subjects actually play the game with an analysis of
how they select the information they need when choosing their strategy. In-
stead of comparing subjects market behavior under diﬀerent informational
frameworks  which is the approach adopted in all the previous experiments
about this topic  we provide players with a broad range of information,
but force them to choose only some pieces of it. Subjects' process of infor-
mation gathering is strictly (but not obtrusively) controlled, by means of a
special software, originally called MouseLab and developed by Johnson et al.
(1988). By paying attention not only to what players do but also to what
they know, it is possible to better understand the mental mechanisms which
guide their choices and consequently the impact of the informational frame-
work on their behavior. The data about subjects' information search pattern
are then integrated in the econometric analysis, via a comprehensive model
of learning built upon the Experience Weighted Attraction (EWA) learning
model developed by Camerer and Ho (1998, 1999).
Our main result is that learning is a complex and faceted process in
which diﬀerent elements coexist. More speciﬁcally: the tendency to best
reply to the strategies adopted by the opponents in previous periods seems
to be the principal driver of players' behavior. Yet, players also display a
tendency to follow the strategies adopted by the most successful among their
opponents, and this form of imitation  or maybe simply learning from
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peers' experience  plays a non negligible role, driving players' choices away
from the best reply towards a more competitive behavior. Finally, a subject's
own experience of the outcomes stemming from the diﬀerent strategies is
relevant too, and exerts on his/her future actions an inﬂuence which is at
least as strong as the pull of imitation.
The paper is structured in the following way: an overview of the theoret-
ical learning models that inform the analysis is presented in Section 2, where
we also brieﬂy survey the experimental literature on learning in oligopoly
games, and on the study of cognition through information search. Section
3 presents the experimental design. Section 4 contains the results of the
experiment and Section 5 concludes.
2. Related Literature
In this Section we review the theoretical and experimental literature on
learning. We ﬁrst draw a taxonomy of diﬀerent theoretical models of learn-
ing, which represents the reference framework for our design and for the
empirical analysis. Then, we discuss previous experimental evidence from
studies aimed at testing the relative importance of diﬀerent learning mod-
els. In this second part, we limit our attention to the papers whose design
is most closely related to ours. This paper focuses on learning in a set-up
where information on the strategic environment is scarce. For this reason, we
do not consider here the growing literature on learning across supergames,
where the goal is to study how behavior stabilizes when subjects have had
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the time to understand all the main details of the strategic situation.2
2.1. Theoretical background
We draw a taxonomy of theoretical learning models, grouping them into
three main categories: experiential learning, adaptive learning, and models
based on imitation. Experiential learning models are characterized by the
general assumption that agents learn exclusively from their own experience.
Agents' beliefs about other players' strategies, as well as information about
opponents' past actions or payoﬀs, do not play any role here. Conversely,
all those models in which these elements are important can be classiﬁed
as observational. In contrast with experiential learning, adaptive learning
presumes that agents are able to observe their rivals' past play and that
their computational capabilities and their knowledge of the game structure
are suﬃcient for them to compute a best response, given the strategy proﬁle
adopted by their opponents. Finally, models based on imitation prescribe
that, in every period after the ﬁrst one, each individual chooses an action
among those which were actually taken by some player in the previous round.
The main diﬀerence among the various imitation-based models consists in
whom is to be imitated.
We now describe each class of models in more detail. This survey will
show that diﬀerent learning rules determine simultaneously (i) the amount
and quality of information agents need in order to make a choice, and (ii)
their actual behavior as a response to the information they may acquire. The
2See for example Dal Bó 2005; Engle-Warnick and Slonim 2006; Camera and Casari
2009; Dal Bó and Fréchette 2011; Fudenberg et al. 2012; Friedman et al. 2012.
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main idea underlying the present work is that observing subjects' informa-
tion search pattern should provide a clue about the learning process they
(consciously or unconsciously) adopt. Comparing information search pat-
terns with actual choices may support some existing learning theories and
suggest the rejection of others.
Experiential Learning. We consider here two approaches to experiential learn-
ing: reinforcement learning, and learning based on trial-and-error. Rein-
forcement learning (Roth and Erev, 1995) rests on the basic hypothesis that
players increase the probability of playing pure strategies that have met with
success in previous periods.3 Theoretical results on the convergence proper-
ties of reinforcement learning in games with a large action space and more
than two players are scarce. By means of a simulation-based analysis, Walt-
man and Kaymak (2008) show that on average the sum of the quantities
produced in a market is signiﬁcantly lower than that predicted by the Nash
equilibrium, yet higher than the joint proﬁt maximizing quantity. However,
it is not clear whether the quantities individually produced by each player
converge in the long run.
Learning by trial-and-error (Huck et al., 2000, 2004) simply prescribes
that subjects move in the direction that was, or would have been, more
successful in the previous period. In a standard symmetric Cournot oligopoly
with n ﬁrms, Huck et al. (2000) show that  by making a few assumptions
on cost functions and market structure  this process converges to the joint
3A variation of the reinforcement learning model has been proposed by Stahl (1996).
However, in his paper reinforcement learning is not applied to single strategies, but to
rules of thumb that map from a player's information to the set of feasible actions.
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proﬁt maximizing equilibrium.
Adaptive learning. According to Milgrom and Roberts (1991), a player's se-
quence of choices is consistent with adaptive learning if the player eventually
chooses only strategies that can be justiﬁed in terms of the competitors'
past play. This justiﬁcation is based on choosing strategies that are un-
dominated if rivals' strategies are restricted to the most recently observed
strategies. Best response dynamic and ﬁctitious play are two examples of
adaptive learning processes.
Originally suggested by Cournot (1838), best response dynamics assume
that in every period each subject sets his current output equal to the best
(i.e., current period payoﬀ maximizing) response to the last period outputs
of his rivals. Cournot (1838) demonstrates that this adjustment process is
stable and converges to the unique Nash equilibrium for a duopoly with linear
demand and constant marginal cost. This result is not general: Theocharis
(1960) shows that best reply dynamics does not converge in oligopolies with
a linear setup and three or more ﬁrms. Huck et al. (1999), however, prove
convergence in ﬁnite time if some inertia is introduced, namely, if it is as-
sumed that with some positive probability in every period each player sticks
to the strategy he chose in the previous period.
Fictitious play (Brown, 1951) assumes that each subject would take the
empirical distribution of the actions chosen in past periods by each of his
opponents to be his belief about that opponent's mixed strategy, and in
every period he would play a best response to this belief when choosing
his current strategy. Shapley (1964) proves that ﬁctitious play does not
necessarily converge to the equilibrium, yet Monderer and Shapley (1996)
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show that for ﬁnite weighted potential games  a class of games that
includes the Cournot game adopted in our paper  every ﬁctitious play
process converges in beliefs to equilibrium.
Models based on imitation. Imitation-based models all rely on the theory of
perturbed Markov processes, but diﬀer in whom is to be imitated.
Vega-Redondo (1997)'s model prescribes to imitate the best, that is, to
choose, in each period, the quantity produced in the previous period by the
ﬁrm that obtained the highest proﬁt. The paper considers a set-up in which
all ﬁrms conform to this rule, but with some small probability, in every period
each ﬁrm mutates, and adopts a diﬀerent strategy. The author shows that,
as the probability of mutation tends to 0, in the limit all ﬁrms produce the
Walrasian quantity.4
An alternative mode, based on imitation of the average, is proposed by
Huck et al. (1999). They assume that subjects who are uncertain about what
to do and observe that the quantity produced on average by the other ﬁrms
diﬀers from their own, imitate this average quantity  thinking along the
lines of `everyone else can't be wrong'. Without inertia the process converges
to the average of all the starting values. With inertia the process depends
on the realizations of the randomization device, hence it is path dependent.
Oﬀerman et al. (2002) propose another model based on imitation of the
exemplary ﬁrm. They assume that there is a tendency to follow the ﬁrm
that sets the good example from the perspective of industry proﬁts, i.e. the
4Alós-Ferrer (2004) expands Vega-Redondo's model by assuming that ﬁrms have longer
memory, and shows that in this case all monomorphic states where ﬁrms produce a quantity
between the Cournot and the Walrasian outcome are stochastically stable.
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ﬁrm (or one of the ﬁrms) that has chosen the level of output that would
have maximized joint proﬁts in the market, had it been followed by all ﬁrms.
The paper shows that if all ﬁrms follow the exemplary one(s), the unique
stochastically stable state of the process is the collusive outcome.
Broadly speaking, models based on imitation could be classiﬁed as ob-
servational learning models. Note, though, that the amount of information
at ﬁrms' disposal varies across them.5 To imitate the best, ﬁrms must have
the opportunity to observe or at least to infer the individual proﬁts of each
of the opponents, while to imitate the average they only need to know the
average output. On the other hand, to imitate the exemplary ﬁrm, they
must have a wider knowledge of the market because the ﬁrms should be able
to evaluate what would be the sum of proﬁts if all the ﬁrms were producing
a given level of output. Indeed, the informational requirement for this model
overlaps the one assumed by models of adaptive learning.
2.2. Experimental Studies
Several experiments investigate the role of information and learning in a
Cournot oligopoly setting. The commonly adopted approach is to vary the
quality and quantity of information provided to the subjects across treat-
ments. The impact of the various informational frameworks on players'
choices is then studied by comparing the subjects' behavior across treat-
5An extended taxonomy of models based on imitation is presented by Apesteguia et al.
(2007), who consider the broader case in which players might observe not only the actions
taken and the payoﬀ realized by their opponents, but also the strategies and payoﬀ of
other agents playing the same game in diﬀerent groups. We chose to restrict information
to the outcome realized within a subject's group, to limit the degree of complexity of our
experimental design.
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ments. Results from those studies are not completely consistent; this can
be due to the some relevant diﬀerences in the experimental design. Indeed,
while the experiments performed by Huck et al. (1999) and by Oﬀerman
et al. (2002) provide a rather strong support for the theory proposed by
Vega Redondo, other works  such as Bosch-Domènech and Vriend (2003)
and Rassenti et al. (2000)  evidence no general trend towards the Wal-
rasian equilibrium and do not ﬁnd any strong indication that players tend to
imitate the one who got the best performance in the previous period.
Huck et al. (1999) study a Cournot oligopoly with linear demand and cost,
in which four symmetric ﬁrms produce a homogeneous good. The treatment
variable is the information provided to the subjects, about the market and
about other players' choices and proﬁts. They ﬁnd that increasing informa-
tion about the market decreases total quantity and harshens competition,
while providing additional information about individual quantities and prof-
its increases total quantity. In a similar set-up, Oﬀerman et al. (2002) study
how players' behavior changes across three treatments, which diﬀer with re-
spect to the amount of information provided to the subjects about individual
quantities and revenues of the other two competitors in their market. The
Walrasian outcome tends only to be reached when players are informed about
their opponents' proﬁts, while the collusive outcome is a stable rest point only
when players get information about the quantities individually produced by
their opponents. On the contrary, when no information about others' indi-
vidual quantities and proﬁts is provided, the only rest-point is represented
by the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
10
Bosch-Domènech and Vriend (2003) investigate whether people are more
inclined to imitate successful behavior in a cognitively demanding environ-
ment. They study Cournot duopolies and triopolies, and vary the way infor-
mation is provided and the time pressure put on the players. The data show
that as the learning-about-the-environment task becomes more complex, av-
erage output increases, but remains far from the Walrasian output level.
In duopolies, imitation of successful behavior tends to decrease rather than
increase when moving to environments where less information is provided;
only for triopolies, when subjects receive very limited information about the
market structure, a weak trend towards the competitive outcome emerges.
Rassenti et al. (2000) study a repeated oligopoly game with homogeneous
products, where cost functions are private information and diﬀer across the
ﬁrms. The demand function is linear, and is public information among the
players. In one treatment, subjects were able to observe past output choices
of each one of their rivals, in the other they were informed only about the past
total output of rivals. The trend of total output over time is not consistent
both with best response dynamic and with ﬁctitious play. In addition, their
experimental evidence supports neither learning models based on imitation,
nor the more traditional hypothesis that information about competitors en-
hances the potential for collusion. The cost asymmetries introduced in this
experiment, however, may partially explain the limited tendency to imitate.
The present work innovates the experimental approach adopted in the
four papers described above, as it introduces the monitoring of the informa-
tion acquisition process through a computer interface. To this purpose, we
adopt a software  originally named MouseLab and developed by Johnson
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et al. (1988)  whose main feature consists in hiding relevant pieces of in-
formation behind a number of boxes on the screen so that to access them
the decision maker has to open the boxes and look at their content, with
the restriction that he can open just one box at a time. To open a box,
the player has to place his mouse cursor over it. By recording the number
and the duration of the look-ups the program provides information about
the decision makers' learning process. MouseLab has been used in several
other studies (Johnson et al., 2002; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Costa-Gomes
and Crawford, 2006; Gabaix et al., 2006), but to our knowledge, ours is the
ﬁrst experiment applying this technique to the analysis of learning processes
in repeated strategic games.6 In a companion paper, Bigoni (2010) adopts
the same technique to study whether subjects' information acquisition pro-
cess and behavior is aﬀected by the learning rule adopted by the opponents,
by letting participants play against computerized automata programmed to
follow a speciﬁc rule. Results indicate that the learning rule followed by
the opponents does not have a strong impact on the model of information
acquisition and processing adopted by the subjects. With respect to Bigoni
(2010), the present paper also presents a more in-depth analysis of subjects'
learning beahvior, based on the EWA approach, as described in Section 4.4.
3. Experimental Design
The market environment of our experiment is similar to the one proposed
in Huck et al. (1999). Four identical ﬁrms compete à la Cournot in the same
6A survey on the experimental study of cognition via information search can be found
in Crawford (2008).
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market for 40 consecutive periods. Their product is perfectly homogeneous.
In every period t each ﬁrm i chooses its own output qti from the discrete set
Γ = {0, 1, ..., 30}, which is the same for every ﬁrm. The choice is simultane-
ous. Price pt in period t is determined by the inverse demand function:
pt = max(0, 81−
∑
i
qti)
Let Ci(qti) = q
t
i be the cost function for every ﬁrm i ; ﬁrm i 's proﬁt in period
t will be denoted by
piti = p
tqti − Ci(qti).
The shape of these functions has been chosen so that the three main the-
oretical outcomes  namely collusive, Cournot and Walrasian outcomes
 are well separated one from the other and belong to the choice set Γ.
More precisely, collusive equilibrium is denoted by ωM = (10, 10, 10, 10),
Cournot-Nash equilibrium is ωN = (16, 16, 16, 16) and Walrasian equilibrium
is ωW = (20, 20, 20, 20).
A time limit of 30 seconds per round was introduced. If a subject failed
to make his choice within the time limit, his quantity was automatically set
equal to 0, granting him a proﬁt of 0 for that period.7 The aim of this
constraint was to force subjects to choose the information they are really
7This happened 22 times (out of 1920), mostly in the ﬁrst four periods. In Bigoni
(2010), no time limit was imposed. Results indicate that the average response time in the
ﬁrst 5 periods ranges between 70 and 85 seconds, while it decreases to about 30-40 seconds
after the tenth period. In light of these previous results, a time limit of 30 seconds appears
to be a lapse long enough to let players take a reasoned decision, while still representing
a binding constraint.
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interested in, and  even more importantly  to reproduce an environment
in which rationality is bounded because of external factors.
3.1. Information provided to the subjects
Participants knew how many competitors they had (anonymity was none-
theless guaranteed). Instructions explained in plain words that there is an
inverse relation between the overall quantity produced by the four ﬁrms and
the market price and that a ﬁrm's production costs increase with the num-
ber of goods it sells. Besides, players were told that per-period proﬁt is
given by the market price times the number of goods sold by the ﬁrm, minus
production costs (see the instructions in Appendix B).
Subjects were also provided with a calculator similar to the one proposed
by Huck et al. (1999). This device had two functions. First, it could be
used as a Best Reply Calculator, that computes the highest possible proﬁt a
subject could get, and the quantity that would yield him this proﬁt, given
an arbitrary quantity produced on the whole by the three competitors. Sec-
ond, it could be used as a Proﬁt Calculator to reckon the proﬁt given both
the quantity produced by the player himself and some arbitrary quantity
produced by his competitors. The software recorded how many times each
subject used the proﬁt calculator and every trial he made.
We did not provide subjects with a complete payoﬀ table, nor did we
inform them about the details of the demand function. This feature of the
design is crucial, as it allows us to investigate how subjects learn to play
when in an environment where ex ante they have no means to adopt a fully
rational proﬁt maximizing behavior.
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The number of rounds was common knowledge among subjects. Accord-
ing to game-theoretic predictions, cooperation should be sustainable only if
our stage game were repeated in(de)ﬁnitely many times. However, Selten
et al. (1997) point out that inﬁnite supergames cannot be credibly replicated
in the laboratory, because a play cannot be continued beyond the maxi-
mum time available. The stopping probability cannot remain ﬁxed but must
become one eventually. In addition, Normann and Wallace (2012) show
that the termination rule does not aﬀect the aggregate subjects' behavior,
except for inducing an end-game eﬀect. In light of these considerations, a
commonly known ﬁnite horizon was introduced, for sake of transparency and
practicality.
In every period after the ﬁrst one, the proﬁts earned in the previous period
by the player himself and by each of his opponents were displayed. Three
distinct buttons  each corresponding to one of the player's competitors 
allowed players to look at the strategy opponents employed in the previous
period. Another button allowed the subject to open a window displaying, by
means of a table and a couple of plots, the quantity chosen and the proﬁts
earned by the player himself in every previous period. It was also possible for
the player to look at the aggregate quantity produced in each of the previous
periods by his competitors. This information was conveyed through a table
and a plot, if the subject pushed the corresponding button. A sixth button
gave access to the calculator. Information was arranged so that there is a
clear correspondence between each of the learning rules described in section
2.1 and subjects' potential choices, as displayed in Table 1.
It was not possible to access more than one piece of information at a
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time, since opening a new window automatically closed the previous one. As
subjects were asked to push a button in order to open a box and obtain the
information hidden behind it, unintentional look-ups are avoided, ensuring a
high level of control over players' information search pattern.
On the computer screen there was a counter showing the running cumula-
tive proﬁts earned by the player since the game began, and a timer displaying
how many seconds remained before the end of the current period. Figure C.1
in Appendix C shows what subjects' computer screen looked like.
3.2. Experimental Procedures
The experiment was run on November 29 and 30, 2007, in the computer
lab of the faculty of Economics, at the University of Bologna, in Italy. It
involved 48 undergraduate students in Business Administration, Law and
Economics, Commercial Studies, Economics, Marketing and Finance. Three
identical sessions were organized, with 16 participants each. The length of
the sessions ranged from one hour to one hour and ﬁfteen minutes, includ-
ing instructions and payment. The average payment was 13 Euro with a
maximum of 17 and a minimum of 9, including a show-up fee of 4 Euro.
At the beginning of each session, subjects were welcomed into the com-
puter room and sat in front of personal computers, and they were instructed
not to communicate in any way with other players during the whole exper-
iment. They received a printed copy of the instructions, which were read
aloud so as to make them common knowledge.8 Thereafter, they had the
opportunity to ask questions, which were answered privately. Before starting
8A translation of the instructions can be found in Appendix B.
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the experiment, subjects were also asked to complete a test on their com-
puter, aimed at checking their understanding of the graphical interface they
would have to use during the game. Only when all the players managed to
answer correctly all the questions in the test, did the experiment begin. Each
subject was randomly and anonymously matched with three other partici-
pants, who were to be his opponents throughout the whole game. At the
end of the session, subjects were paid in cash, privately, in proportion to the
proﬁts they scored during the game. The experiment was programmed and
conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
4. Results
In this Section, we ﬁrst present some qualitative results about the output
choices made by the subjects, and about their information search pattern.
By means of a non-parametric approach, we then classify subjects according
to the model of learning that best accounts for their information acquisition
behavior, and we study whether subjects who display diﬀerent information
acquisition patterns also diﬀer in terms of their approach to learning. We
also consider how learning evolves as subjects gain experience, using this
classiﬁcatory approach. To assess the prevalence of diﬀerent approaches to
learning in the population in a more general way, we consider an extension of
the Camerer and Ho (1998)'s Experience Weighted Attraction (EWA) learn-
ing model.9 We show how reduced form parameters of this generalized EWA
model can be used to assess the relative weight of each learning approach on
9Appendix A discusses the identiﬁcation of the structural parameters of this generalized
EWA model.
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the level of attraction that players attach to available strategies.
4.1. Overview of the results
Figure 1 and Table 2 present information about individual output.10
First, we observe that the average output across all periods (17.6) is higher
than the Cournot output (16), but lower than the Walrasian one (20) which,
however, is the modal output in the ﬁrst 10, and in the last 20 periods.11
The Pareto-dominant collusive outcome of 10 is chosen only in 5.4% of the
cases.
Table 2 shows an increase in the average output as the game proceeds. A
non parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicates that the quantity pro-
duced on average by each group of four players from period 1 to 20 is sig-
niﬁcantly lower than the quantity produced from period 21 to 40 (N=12,
p-value: 0.0196).12 Consequently, individual proﬁts decrease across periods,
and on average they remain substantially below the Cournot proﬁt (512)
throughout the whole game.
Table 2 also reports the standard deviation of the individual output,
both within groups and across groups. The variability of individual output
within groups does not decrease as subjects gain experience, as it would if all
subjects adopted one of the four simple learning rules described in Section 2.1,
10In Figure 1 and in Table 2, the average is evaluated dropping the 22 observations (out
of 1920) in which the outcome was zero because one of the subjects did not answer in
time.
11We also observe peaks corresponding to multiples of ﬁve, revealing a tendency to
simplify the game focusing only on some of the available strategies, which can probably
explain why 15 is chosen more often than 16, representing the Nash equilibrium in the
stage game.
12Two-sided test, groups of four subjects are taken as units of observation.
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hence converging on the same output level. For this reason, it is diﬃcult to
draw conclusions on the learning rule adopted by the subjects, by considering
only their actual behavior: observing how subjects distributed their attention
among the diﬀerent pieces of information gains even more interest. For this
reason, we now turn to a more in depth analysis of subjects' information
acquisition process. Our data suggest the following result:
Result 1. The majority of subjects adopt an information acquisition pattern
compatible with Adaptive Learning.
A ﬁrst piece of evidence in support of Result 1 comes from Table 3,
which reports information on the fraction of subjects who accessed each piece
of information, and on the average look-up times. It reveals that the vast
majority of subjects look at least at one piece of information before making a
choice. Only about one third of the subjects paid attention to their own past
records, which suggests that experiential learning models ﬁnd weak support
in our data.13 By contrast, aggregate competitors' output in past periods is
an element that most subjects consult, throughout the whole game.
Another noticeable fact emerges from Table 3: the fraction of subjects
looking at the output individually chosen by their competitors in the previ-
ous period increases from the ﬁrst to the second half of the session, by about
10 percentage points. This shift in subjects' attention together with the pre-
viously observed increase in the average output level seems to be in line with
13Subjects who adopt such models should pay attention only to their own past actions
and proﬁts, and not to those of the others. Yet, it could well be that subjects do not look
at these pieces of information because they remember it, and they prefer to acquire new
elements rather than refreshing their memory of something they in fact already know.
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Vega-Redondo's model. Notice also that on average, subjects do not only
devote attention to the output chosen in the previous period by their best
performing competitor, but also look at the output individually produced by
other competitors, which is in partial contradiction with what is suggested by
Vega-Redondo's theory of imitation. Subjects in this experiment seem to be
concerned not only with the choice made by the competitor who performed
best in the previous period, but also with the output chosen by each of the
others.
Throughout the whole session, on average subjects spend about 20 sec-
onds browsing the available information, before making a choice; no relevant
trend across periods emerges under this respect. The ﬁgures on the average
look-up times also reveal that using the Proﬁt and Best Reply calculator
takes longer than accessing the other pieces of information. About half of
the subjects use of the calculator in this game. In particular, this device is
mostly used to evaluate the myopic best reply to some aggregate quantity
hypothetically produced by the player's opponents (see Table 4).
If a subject adopted some kind of adaptive learning, before using the
calculator he should have gathered information about his competitors aggre-
gate output in previous periods, by opening the appropriate boxes.14 When
this happens, we argue that the look-up sequence is consistent with adaptive
learning (AL), and it turns out that this is the case in more than 90% of the
times the calculator is used (Table 4).
14We consider a look-up sequence to be consistent with a best reply when  before using
the proﬁt calculator  the subject looks at the aggregate competitors' output, or at the
individual output of each of the other three competitors.
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When using the calculator, subjects have to enter a number corresponding
to the hypothetical aggregate quantity produced by their opponents. This
quantity can be seen as a proxy for their expectations about their competi-
tors' future strategies. Table 5 displays the results obtained regressing this
variable on the sum of the quantities produced by the player's opponents in
the previous six periods.15 According to these results, players' expectations
are explained to a large extent by opponents' output observed in the previous
two periods, in line with models of adaptive learning with short memory.16
4.2. Learning
The novel aspect of our dataset as compared to the previous experiments
on learning in oligopolistic settings is that it allows to verify whether the
learning model adopted by a subject drives both his information acquisition
process, and his actual choices in the Cournot game. To test this hypothesis,
here we consider the four broad categories of learning summarized in Table
1 (Experiential Learning, Adaptive Learning, Imitate the Best and Imitate
the Average), and classify each subject according to the category that better
predicts his information acquisition process. If our hypothesis is correct, we
should observe that a speciﬁc learning model better predicts the choices of
those subjects whose information acquisition process is compatible with that
learning approach. We ﬁnd the following result.
15The model includes individual ﬁxed eﬀects, and standard errors are clustered at the
group level.
16In 44.14% of cases, the quantity used in the calculator is exactly identical to the
quantity produced by competitors in the previous period.
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Result 2. A relation emerges between subjects' information acquisition pro-
cess and their actual behavior: those who focus their attention on the pieces
of information that are crucial for a speciﬁc learning rule also adjust their
choices consistently with that learning rule.
Our empirical evidence is based on an approach similar to the one pro-
posed by Huck et al. (1999), which we apply ﬁrst over the whole sample, and
then separately for each of the categories of subjects identiﬁed on the basis
of their information acquisition process. To classify subjects into the four
learning categories, we consider the total look-up time spent collecting the
information necessary to apply each of the four learning approaches.17 Based
on this measure, for each subject and each period we identify the category of
learning that captures the longest look-up time. We also consider a residual
category, which includes all the cases in which most of the look-up time is
spent looking at pieces of information that are not compatible with any of the
four categories we consider, so that the classiﬁcation represents a complete
partition. Subjects are then classiﬁed into the category, or the categories,
that capture their information acquisition behavior in most of the periods. If
all the four categories perform equally well, the subject is not classiﬁed. To
compare the explanatory power of each category of models of learning, sub-
ject by subject, we perform pairwise comparisons between categories, using
17We exclude the look-up time dedicated to the Proﬁt and Best-Reply Calculator, be-
cause it is disproportionately longer than the look-up time necessary to acquire the other
pieces of information (see Table 3). Whenever a subject acquires the information necessary
either to Imitate the Average, or to adopt some form of Adaptive Learning, to discriminate
between the two we consider whether the look-up sequence is consistent with a Best-Reply
process.
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a z-test (Suissa and Shuster, 1985).18
This procedure classiﬁes all subjects but three, and no subjects is clas-
siﬁed under more than one category. It yields the following classiﬁcation:
Adaptive Learning includes 29 subjects, Imitate the Average includes 14
subjects, and Reinforcement Learning includes 2 subjects. The category
of Imitate the Best does not include any subject. Table 6 reports the aver-
age output and the average proﬁt, by category of subjects. It reveals that
subjects classiﬁed under Adaptive Learning on average choose output lev-
els that are signiﬁcantly lower than those chosen by subjects classiﬁed under
Imitate the Average. Diﬀerences in Proﬁts are not statistically signiﬁcant.19
To explore whether subjects who diﬀer in terms of their information ac-
quisition process in fact also adopt diﬀerent learning models, we follow the
approach adopted in Huck et al. (1999), and estimate the following equation:
qti − qt−1i = β0 + βBR(qt−1BR − qt−1i ) + βImitB(qt−1ImitB − qt−1i )+
+ βImitA(q
t−1
ImitA − qt−1i ) + βT&E(qt−1T&E − qt−1i ) (1)
where qt−1BR denotes subject i's best reply to the opponents' aggregate output
in period t − 1, qImitB denotes the output chosen by the most successful
subject(s) in the group, in period t− 1,20 qImitA denotes the average output
chosen by the three opponents in period t − 1, and qT&E denotes the sign
18The R routines used for this part of the analysis have been kindly provided by Karl
Schlag, whom we gratefully thank for suggesting this approach.
19Signiﬁcance levels are obtained by means of regressions with standard errors clustered
at the group level, which are available from the authors upon request.
20Here and throughout the whole paper, the most successful player may be the subject
himself. In this case qt−1ImitB = q
t−1
i .
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of the variation in the output predicted by a Trial and Error learning model
(Huck et al., 2000, 2004). This last element is not included in the version of
this regression adopted by Huck et al. (1999). We chose to add it in order
to incorporate exactly one model for each of the categories of learning we
consider.
Regression results are reported in Table 7. We ﬁrst estimate the model
over the full sample, then we distinguish between subjects classiﬁed under
Adaptive learning and all the others, and ﬁnally we isolate those classiﬁed
under Imitate the Average.21 In line with what already found by Huck
et al. (1999), all coeﬃcients have the expected sign, but adjustment is only
partial, as all coeﬃcients are far away from 1. Among all subjects, the
learning rules based on the Best Response Dynamics and on Imitation of the
Average seem to play a substantial role. However, consistently with ﬁndings
from a related experiment in Bigoni (2010), a strong link emerges between the
information acquisition pattern adopted by the subjects, and their learning
approach. Among subjects classiﬁed under Adaptive Learning, the learning
rule based on Best-Response Dynamics is the most important factor, even if
the estimated coeﬃcients βBR and βImitA are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. By
contrast, the relative weight of the two learning rules based on imitation is
markedly higher for subjects classiﬁed under Imitate the Average. Finally,
the learning rule based on Trial-and-Error does not ﬁnd strong support in our
data: the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant for any of the categories of subjects we
21In principle, one would like to estimate the model separately also for subjects classiﬁed
under Reinforcement learning, but in our case the sample size would be too small for
meaningful elaborations.
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identiﬁed. This conﬁrms what already suggested by data in Table 3, which
shows that on average subjects paid little attention to their own past records.
4.3. Learning to learn
To check whether subjects' approach to learning evolves with experience,
we repeated the classiﬁcatory procedure presented in section 4.2 separately
for the ﬁrst 20 and the last 20 periods of play. Results are reported in Table
8. Most of the subjects (69%) are classiﬁed under the same category in the
ﬁrst and second half of the session. Of the remaining subjects, 3 are never
classiﬁed, 5 switch from Adaptive Learning to Imitate the Average, 4 switch
to Adaptive Learning from other categories, and 3 are multiply classiﬁed in
the last 20 periods.
To the same end, we also estimate equation (1) separately for the ﬁrst and
the second half of the session, using the classiﬁcation of subjects obtained
separately for these two blocks of periods. Results are reported in Tables 9
and 10.
Two relevant ﬁndings emerge from Tables 9 and 10. First, in the ﬁrst
20 periods of play, the learning model based on Trial and Error plays a
non negligible role, especially among the subjects classiﬁed under Adaptive
Learning; in the last 20 periods instead, the weight of this model becomes
negligible. Second, for all subjects, the relative importance of models based
on imitation increases over time.
4.4. Experience Weighted Attraction learning model.
As the purpose of this study is not to test one or more speciﬁc models of
learning, but rather to explore how subjects choose between diﬀerent pieces
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of information available, and how they react to these elements intentionally
collected, we develop an approach ﬂexible enough to incorporate a broader
spectrum of models, and appropriate for assessing which among these is
more suitable to represent agents' behavior. To this aim, we start from the
Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA) learning model.
The EWA model was ﬁrst proposed by Camerer and Ho (1998) and Ho
et al. (2008).22 It is a model that hybridizes features of other well known
learning rules, such as reinforcement learning and adaptive learning, and
that thanks to its ﬂexibility has proven to ﬁt data better than other models.
This model is based on the idea that every player assigns to each strategy a
given level of attraction, which can be represented by a number. Attractions
are updated after every period, according to the players' experiences, and
determine every player's probability distribution over his or her choice set.
In the original EWA model, attractions are updated using the payoﬀ that
a strategy yielded in a period, and also the foregone proﬁts a player would
have earned had he chosen a diﬀerent strategy. In the experiment presented
here, foregone payoﬀs from unused strategies are not known to the players.
Subjects, though, can use the calculator to discover the proﬁt a particular
strategy would yield, given the strategies chosen by the other players. As
explained in section 3.1, the calculator has two functions: (i) it can be used
by a player for evaluating the quantity that would yield him the highest proﬁt
given the aggregate quantity produced by his competitors, and for calculating
22The version of EWA learning we adopt as the basis of our analysis is a simpler and in
many cases more workable version of the model  named self tuning EWA learning 
developed by Ho et al. (2007).
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the proﬁt he would earn in the event that he produced the suggested amount
of good (Best Reply calculator); (ii) it can also be used to determine the
proﬁt given both the quantity produced by the player and the sum of the
quantities produced by his opponents (Proﬁt calculator). By checking how
a player used the calculator, we know precisely which information he uses to
evaluate each strategy in every period.
If they wish, players can also access information about the strategies
individually adopted in the previous period by their competitors. If they
wanted to imitate the strategy chosen by the player who got the highest proﬁt
in the previous period  as suggested by Vega-Redondo  they would attach
a higher attraction to that strategy, while virtually no relevance should be
attributed to other elements.
Keeping these peculiar characteristics of the design in mind, we modify
the attraction updating rule, so that in every period t attractions evolve
depending on three elements: (i) the proﬁt pii(s
j
i , s−i(t−1)) actually obtained
by the player in period t − 1; (ii) the proﬁts piji,imit(t − 1) obtained by each
of the player's opponents playing strategy sj in the previous period; (iii) the
proﬁts piji,BRC(t) and pi
j
i,PC(t) evaluated by the player using the Best Reply
and the Proﬁt calculator respectively, given his or her expectations about
the competitors' choices.23
While the player always knows the strategy he played in the previous
round and the proﬁt he obtained, piimit, piBRC and piPC may be known or
23If the Proﬁt calculator is used more than once by player i in period t for the same
strategy j, the proﬁt piji,PC(t) is calculated as an average of the various proﬁts associated
to strategy sji by the device (diﬀerent proﬁts correspond to diﬀerent hypotheses about the
other players' behavior).
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unknown to the player, depending on the pieces of information he or she
looks up. To control for the information the subject is aware of, we deﬁne
four dummy variables. dji,BRC(t) takes value 1 if in period t player i uses the
Best Reply calculator, and this device indicates strategy sj as the best reply
given the strategies played by the three opponents; it takes value 0 otherwise.
dji,PC(t) takes value 1 if in period t player i uses the Proﬁt calculator to check
the proﬁt that strategy sj would yield, given the opponents' strategies; it
takes value 0 otherwise. dji,h(t) takes value 1 if player i in period t knows that
his opponent h played strategy sj in the previous period, and 0 otherwise.
bi,h(t − 1) takes value 1 if player h had the highest proﬁt in period t − 1
among the opponents of player i, and 0 otherwise.
As a result, the updating rule for attractions is:
Aji (t) =
φi(t)N(t− 1)Aji (t− 1) + αpii(sji , s−i(t− 1))I(sji , si(t− 1))
N(t)
+
+
βdji,BRC(t)pi
j
i,BRC(t) + γd
j
i,PC(t)pi
j
i,PC(t)
N(t)
+
+

∑
h6=i d
j
i,h(t)bi,h(t− 1)piji,imit(t− 1)
N(t)
+
ζ
∑
h6=i d
j
i,h(t)(1− bi,h(t− 1))piji,imit(t− 1)
N(t)
(2)
where sji denotes strategy j of player i, s−i(t) the strategy vector played
by player i's opponents in period t. I(x, y) is an indicator function which
takes value 1 if x = y and value 0 otherwise, and pii(s
j
i , s−i(t)) is the payoﬀ i
choosing strategy j when his or her opponents play s−i(t).
The parameter α measures the impact of reinforcement learning on at-
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tractions; parameters β and γ capture the eﬀect of the information obtained
through the proﬁt calculator, hence the role of diﬀerent forms of adaptive
learning; ﬁnally, parameters  and ζ allow to assess the importance of alterna-
tive models of learning through imitation, of the best and of other opponents,
respectively.
N(t) is a measure of the weight players put on past attractions relative
to present ones, and is deﬁned as: N(t) = φi(t)N(t − 1) + 1 t ≥ 1. It can
be interpreted as the number of observation-equivalents of past experience
relative to one period of current experience. The initial valueN(0) is set equal
to 1. Function φi(t) has the role of a discount factor, that depreciates previous
attractions. The hypothesis made in Ho et al. (2007) is that the weight put
on previous experiences should be lower when the player senses that the
environment is unstable or that the strategies adopted by her opponents
are changing. The authors then build a surprise index Si(t) measuring
the diﬀerence between opponents' most recently chosen strategies and the
strategies they adopted in all previous periods, and let φi(t) = 1 − 12Si(t).
The surprise index is made up of two main elements: a cumulative history
vector hi(t) and a recent history vector ri(t). The vector element h
j
i (t) =∑t
τ=1 I(s
j
−i,s−i(τ))
t
measures the frequency with which strategy sj−i was adopted
by player i's opponents in period t and in all previous ones. Vector ri(t)
has the k-th element equal to 1 and all other elements equal to 0, where
sk−i = s−i(t). The surprise index Si(t) simply sums up the squared deviations
between the cumulative history vector hi(t) and the immediate history vector
ri(t):
Si(t) =
∑
j
(hji (t)− rji (t))2.
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Since in the game considered here the strategy space is rather big, we use
the sum of the quantities produced by player's opponents instead of s−i(t) 
representing the strategy adopted by the three opponents in period t  when
calculating the surprise index Si(t).24
Attractions determine probabilities. More speciﬁcally: the probability
Pijt that player i chooses strategy j in period t is assumed to be monotonically
increasing in Aji (t) and decreasing in A
κ
i (t), κ 6= j. The relation between
attractions and choice probabilities is represented by a logistic stochastic
response function:
Pijt =
eλA
j
i (t)∑
k e
λAki (t)
(3)
where the parameter λ measures sensitivity of players to attractions.25
Appendix A discusses the identiﬁcation of the model parameters and pro-
vides information about the variables initialization. The Generalized EWA
model can be written as a conditional logit model with reduced form param-
eters τ1 ≡ λα, τ2 ≡ λβ, τ3 ≡ λγ, τ4 ≡ λ , τ5 ≡ λζ that completely charac-
terize it. While the scale factor λ is not identiﬁed, provided that λ 6= 0,26 the
reduced form parameters τk, allow us to assess the relative strength of each
factor on the attractions Aji (t).
27 Therefore, in what follows we will focus on
24By deﬁnition, Si(t) is bounded between 0 and 2, and as a consequence, φi(t) is bounded
between 0 and 1. Since N(0) = 1, it also follows that N(t) ≥ 1 ∀t.
25Probabilities are monotonically increasing in attractions under the assumption that
λ > 0.
26Note that if λ = 0, all reduced form parameters should also be zero. One can check
whether the assumption is plausible in each speciﬁc empirical application.
27Properties of the maximum likelihood estimator for the conditional logit parameters
τk, k = 1, 2, . . . , 5 follow from McFadden (1974) who presents necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for the existence of a maximum and its uniqueness.
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the ratios between structural parameters (α/β, α/γ, α/, α/ζ, . . ., /ζ).
We estimate the reduced form conditional logit model by maximum like-
lihood on four samples: ﬁrst, we estimate the model on the full sample, in-
cluding all individuals and all periods. Then we split the sample into groups
of individuals following the classiﬁcation introduced in Section 4.2 and es-
timate the model in each subsample, as in Table 7. We expect that the
relative weight of each factor in determining the attraction changes across
subsamples: information coming from the proﬁt calculator (parameters β
and γ) should have the strongest impact on attractions for subjects classiﬁed
under Adaptive learning; conversely, attractions should be mainly driven
by information about the opponents' proﬁts (parameters  and ζ) for sub-
jects classiﬁed under Imitate the Average. We can summarize our results
as follows:
Result 3. Adaptive learning is the main driving force for all types of subjects.
Imitation is also an important factor, especially for subjects who pay relatively
more attention to their opponents' individual choices.
Support for Result 3 comes from Table 11 and Table 12. Reduced form
parameters (in Table 11) are precisely estimated in all cases, and they are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.28 Based on these results, we can rule out
28The estimated information matrix is non-singular supporting empirical identiﬁcation
of the model (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004, chpt. 5). The condition numbers 
deﬁned as the square root of the ratio of the largest to the smallest eigenvalue of the
empirical information matrix at the maximum likelihood solution  associated to the es-
timated models reported in Table 11 range between 1.6 and 3.2, i.e. are small. The
estimated correlation between parameters is also small (not exceeding 0.00001 in all cases,
for all subsamples) further supporting the fact that in our sample we observe enough
variability to identify all the reduced form parameters.
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that λ is zero in all subsamples; as a consequence, all the relative weights
of the diﬀerent pieces of information on attractions are well deﬁned. Their
estimates are presented in Table 12. Standard errors and conﬁdence intervals
are computed via delta method.
Results indicate that Adaptive learning is the main driving force, over the
full sample, and in the three speciﬁc subsamples: in most cases, parameters β
and γ are signiﬁcantly larger than α,  and ζ.29 Estimates in Table 11 suggest
that Reinforcement learning and Imitation also play a role, as the coeﬃcients
for λα, λ, and λζ are all signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. However, one can
hardly detect any diﬀerence about the magnitude of role of the two (Table
12, 95% C.I. for α/ and α/ζ include 1 in almost all samples). In addition,
the evidence supports the idea that subjects, when evaluating a strategy, do
take into account the proﬁts realized by other players choosing that strategy,
but do not attach more weight to the proﬁt realized by the best among their
competitors. Indeed, the 95% conﬁdence interval for /ζ always includes 1.
The comparison of results between subjects classiﬁed under Imitate the
average and under Adaptive learning conﬁrms that, for the ﬁrst subsample,
Imitation becomes relatively more important than Adaptive and Reinforce-
ment learning, consistently with what we ﬁnd in Table 7. The diﬀerence
across sub-samples, however, is not statistically signiﬁcant.30 Finally we ob-
serve that, according to our estimates, subjects tend to attribute similar
29To see this, note that the bounds of the 95% conﬁdence intervals are both below 1 for
the ratios α/β and α/γ, while for the ratios β/, β/ζ, γ/, and γ/ζ they are both above
1, in all samples but the one where we group together all subjects that are not classiﬁed
under Adaptive learning.
30We tested this by estimating the fully interacted model. Results are available from
the authors upon request.
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importance to the results from the Best Reply calculator and from the Proﬁt
Calculator: the 95% conﬁdence interval for β/γ includes 1, in the full sample
(however, it does not include it for the sub-sample of subjects classiﬁed as
Adaptive learning, where β < γ at 5% level, since the extremes of 95%
conﬁdence interval for the parameter β/γ are both below 1).
5. Conclusion
In this paper we presented an experiment in which subjects were asked to
play a repeated Cournot game with incomplete information. The ﬁrst aim of
the experiment was to check what feedback information subjects are really
interested in, and to test how information is linked to the learning model
adopted and in turn to the market outcome.
According to our data, learning appears to be a composite process, in
which diﬀerent components coexist. Adaptive learning seems to be the lead-
ing element, as subjects form expectations about their opponents' future
actions and try to best reply to them. It is also noticeable that in most of
the cases the opponents' output inputted in the proﬁt calculator  a proxy
for players' expectations  is explained to a large extent by opponents' out-
put observed in the previous two periods. This means that either subjects
expected their opponents not to change their strategy much or that they
decided to use the proﬁt calculator only when the opponents' strategy was
stable enough to let them make predictions about the future. A considerable
amount of look-up time is dedicated to the strategies individually adopted
by competitors. This could be compatible with imitation of the best, as in
Vega-Redondo's theory. Yet, our results suggest that players are not only
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interested in output produced by the most successful competitor, but by all
of their opponents. These results are conﬁrmed by the estimates obtained via
our generalized version of Experience Weighted Attraction learning model,
suggesting that there is no diﬀerence between the weight attached to the
proﬁts collected by the most successful opponent and by the other competi-
tors and that imitation is not the main driving force in the observed learning
process.
The results we obtain via our generalized EWA model stress the impor-
tance played by reinforcement learning in this setting: even though subjects
do not pay much attention to information concerning their own past history
of play, when assessing the strength of a strategy they seem to take into
greater consideration their own experience than what they know about other
players' results. This lead us to think that probably they do not need to look
at the relative information, because they have a clear memory at least of the
most recent periods.
This experiment aims at contributing to the understanding of learning
mechanisms in game-like situations. It adopts a new experimental approach,
based on the Mouselab technique, which allows us to complement the ob-
servation of the choices actually made by subjects with detailed data on their
information acquisition patterns. Our results suggest that this tool could be
usefully adopted in other experiments on learning and to investigate other
interesting situations in which imperfect information of some of the agents
plays a crucial role, or in which reputation is an asset. Examples might
be auctions and ﬁnancial markets, but also markets where hiding some at-
tributes of the good being sold or the price of its add-ons may enable the
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sellers to get proﬁts well above the competitive level. In experiments on these
issues, it could be useful to have a strict control on the pieces of information
subjects focus their attention on. Indeed, a better understanding of the rela-
tion between the inputs provided to economic agents and their choices could
lead to improvements in the regulation of information disclosure, bringing
the market outcome toward a more eﬃcient equilibrium.
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6. Tables & Figures
Figure 1: Frequency distributions of individual output levels, across periods.
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Table 1: information required by diﬀerent models of learning.
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aggregate competitors' quantity in previous rounds x x
player's own proﬁts and quantities in previous rounds x
last round individual proﬁt and quantity of all com-
petitors
x
last round individual proﬁt and quantity of the best
competitor
x
proﬁt/best reply calculator x x∗
∗ Only at the beginning of the game, when players do not know the structure of the
market.
Table 2: Individual output and proﬁts.
Output
Average s.d. across groups s.d. within groups Proﬁt
Periods 1-10 16.7 2.7 5.1 220.9
Periods 11-20 17.3 2.0 5.1 184.4
Periods 21-30 18.2 2.6 5.9 142.8
Periods 31-40 18.1 2.6 5.4 149.8
Total 17.6 2.5 5.4 174.4
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Table 3: Pattern of information acquisition.
Periods
Total 1-20 21-40
Proﬁt and best-reply calculator 49.9%(13.7) 51.8%(14.3) 48.1%(13.0)
Aggregate competitors' output 68.1% (6.1) 66.8% (6.2) 69.5% (6.0)
Player's past proﬁts and output 34.4% (6.5) 34.6% (6.3) 34.3% (6.8)
Output of the best performer 41.3% (4.3) 36.8% (4.2) 45.7% (4.4)
Output of other competitors 45.3% (6.2) 39.8% (6.4) 50.8% (6.1)
Total information 93.6%(19.6) 92.7%(19.9) 94.5%(19.3)
Note: Average look-up times, in seconds, are reported in parentheses. Averages are
computed considering only subjects who accessed each speciﬁc piece of information.
Table 4: Use of the two functions of the calculator, and percentage of observations
in which the look-up sequence is consistent with a best reply to the aggregate quantity
observed in the previous period.
N. obs (%) % of Look-up sequences
consistent with
Adaptive Learning
both functions 130 (13.56%) 96.92%
1st function (best reply) only 584 (60.90%) 93.84%
2nd function only 245 (25.55%) 87.76%
total 959 92.70%
Proﬁt calculator not used 961 
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Table 5: Quantity input into the Proﬁt Calculator
1st function (best reply) 2nd function
Competitors' aggregate
output in period:
t− 1 0.466*** 0.541***
(0.06) (0.06)
t− 2 0.149*** 0.192**
(0.03) (0.06)
t− 3 0.031 -0.053
(0.03) (0.07)
t− 4 0.072 0.134*
(0.04) (0.07)
t− 5 0.024 -0.086
(0.03) (0.10)
t− 6 -0.017 0.029
(0.03) (0.05)
Constant 14.184** 12.411
(4.59) (7.93)
Sample size 649 330
The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Table 6: Classiﬁcation of subjects into categories of learning models.
Category N. Output Proﬁt
Mean [C. I.] Mean [C. I.]
Others 5 18.8 [14.9,22.8] 170.0 [94.0,246.0]
∼ ∼
Imitate the Average 14 18.7 [17.2,20.1] 187.6 [155.6,219.6]
∨∗∗ ∼
Adaptive Learning 29 16.9 [16.2,17.5] 164.9 [139.2,190.7]
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Table 7: Regression results from equation (1).
Parameter Samples
Full Adaptive Others Imitate the
Sample Learning Average
Period 0.049*** 0.044** 0.062** 0.051**
(0.016) (0.019) (0.029) (0.022)
βBR 0.401*** 0.443*** 0.322*** 0.277***
(0.024) (0.018) (0.049) (0.086)
βImitB 0.058** 0.024 0.120*** 0.154***
(0.023) (0.030) (0.042) (0.038)
βImitA 0.378*** 0.330*** 0.464*** 0.471***
(0.067) (0.070) (0.103) (0.079)
βT&E 0.104 0.154 0.048 0.193
(0.135) (0.192) (0.264) (0.299)
β0 0.301 0.122 0.607 0.530
(0.344) (0.468) (0.487) (0.658)
Sample size 1809 1093 716 528
Log-likelihood -5504.5 -3304.3 -2184.4 -1565.5
Wald tests on the estimated coeﬃcients (p-values).
βBR = βImitB 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0064*** 0.2817
βBR = βImitA 0.7800 0.1502 0.2416 0.1948
βImitA = βImitB 0.0002*** 0.0010*** 0.0087*** 0.0005***
The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
The model includes random eﬀects at the individual level, and standard errors are clustered
at the group level. The regression is run using the Stata GLLAMM package (Skrondal
and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004).
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Table 9: Regression results from equation (1), for periods 1-20.
Parameter Samples
Full Adaptive Others Imitate the
Sample Learning Average
Period 0.039 0.001 0.147*** 0.056
(0.030) (0.050) (0.041) (0.137)
βBR 0.415*** 0.439*** 0.304** 0.451***
(0.038) (0.024) (0.136) (0.093)
βImitB 0.056 -0.031 0.102 0.305***
(0.039) (0.049) (0.102) (0.095)
βImitA 0.370*** 0.340*** 0.564*** 0.273**
(0.087) (0.094) (0.089) (0.130)
βT&E 0.403*** 0.474* 0.174 0.654
(0.152) (0.262) (0.294) (0.444)
β0 0.398 0.813 -0.442 0.241
(0.557) (0.769) (0.525) (2.106)
Sample size 855 499 249 107
Log-likelihood -2604.3 -1505.3 -740.6 -333.9
Wald tests on the estimated coeﬃcients (p-values).
βBR = βImitB 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.3831 0.4051
βBR = βImitA 0.6772 0.2947 0.1967 0.3669
βImitA = βImitB 0.0012*** 0.0053*** 0.0000*** 0.7990
The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
The model includes random eﬀects at the individual level, and standard errors are clustered
at the group level. The regression is run using the Stata GLLAMM package (Skrondal
and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004).
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Table 10: Regression results from equation (1), for periods 21-40.
Parameter Samples
Full Adaptive Others Imitate the
Sample Learning Average
Period 0.016 0.024 -0.035 0.173
(0.021) (0.027) (0.029) (0.127)
βBR 0.415*** 0.471*** 0.331*** 0.562**
(0.031) (0.040) (0.062) (0.237)
βImitB 0.067* 0.105*** 0.073 -0.192
(0.039) (0.037) (0.060) (0.305)
βImitA 0.503*** 0.438*** 0.592*** 0.700**
(0.040) (0.053) (0.063) (0.282)
βT&E -0.179 -0.270 0.162 -2.175***
(0.178) (0.221) (0.198) (0.680)
β0 1.349** -0.378 4.253*** 0.416
(0.678) (0.951) (1.129) (3.952)
Sample size 954 537 378 79
Log-likelihood -2866.3 -1549.1 -1153.8 -256.3
Wald tests on the estimated coeﬃcients (p-values).
βBR = βImitB 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.2367 0.0076***
βBR = βImitA 0.0940* 0.4931 0.0142** 0.5040
βImitA = βImitB 0.0000*** 0.0003*** 0.0008*** 0.0000***
The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
The model includes random eﬀects at the individual level, and standard errors are clustered
at the group level. The regression is run using the Stata GLLAMM package (Skrondal
and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004).
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Table 11: Conditional logit model estimates. Full sample and subsample by information
acquisition patterns.
Parameter Samples
Full Adaptive Others Imitate the
Sample Learning Average
Reinforcement
Learning
λα 0.009∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Adaptive
Learning
λβ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
λγ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Imitation
λ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
λζ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Obs 58032 35061 22971 16926
LogL -5673.948 -3332.253 -2326.865 -1700.242
Condition
number+
2.001 1.668 3.250 3.062
N.subjects++ 48 29 19 14
+ The condition number is deﬁned as the square root of the ratio of the largest to the
smallest eigenvalue of the empirical information matrix at the maximum likelihood solu-
tion.
++ Each subjects contributes to the estimates with J × (T − 1) = 31× 39 observations. 3
subjects are not classiﬁed (see Section 4.2 in the text) but observations for these subjects
are included in the full sample. Standard errors are clustered at the group level and allow
for dependency within clusters.
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Table 12: Maximum likelihood estimates of the relative weight of each factor on attractions
calculated using the reduced form estimates in Table 11. Standard errors obtained by
the delta method in parentheses. Full sample and subsample by information acquisition
patterns.
Structural Samples
Parameters Adaptive Imitate the
Contrast Full Sample Learning Others Average
α/β 0.512∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗
s.e. (0.063) (0.120) (0.057) (0.105)
95% c.i. [0.388,0.637] [0.093,0.562] [0.513,0.735] [0.450,0.872]
α/γ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.749∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.085) (0.280) (0.264)
95% c.i. [0.343,0.524] [0.088,0.442] [0.201,1.297] [0.125,1.161]
α/ 1.349∗∗∗ 0.911∗∗∗ 1.638∗∗∗ 1.380∗∗∗
(0.224) (0.357) (0.303) (0.237)
95% c.i. [0.910,1.787] [0.211,1.611] [1.044,2.232] [0.916,1.845]
α/ζ 1.201∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ 1.321∗∗∗ 1.187∗∗∗
(0.208) (0.375) (0.295) (0.198)
95% c.i. [0.794,1.608] [0.145,1.614] [0.743,1.899] [0.799,1.575]
β/γ 0.847∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 1.201∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗
(0.921) (0.097) (0.480) (0.408)
95% c.i. [0.667,1.027] [0.589,0.967] [0.261,2.141] [0.167,1.766]
β/ 2.633∗∗∗ 2.781∗∗∗ 2.627∗∗∗ 2.074∗∗∗
(0.333) (0.406) (0.352) (0.386)
95% c.i. [1.980,3.287] [1.986,3.576] [1.936,3.318] [1.318,2.830]
β/ζ 2.345∗∗∗ 2.684∗∗∗ 2.118∗∗∗ 1.783∗∗∗
(0.419) (0.512) (0.489) (0.462)
 95% c.i. [1.525,3.166] [1.682,3.687] [1.162,3.075] [0.878,2.687]
γ/ 3.109∗∗∗ 3.575 ∗∗∗ 2.187∗∗∗ 2.146∗∗∗
(0.627) (0.818) (0.932) (0.903)
95% c.i. [1.880,4.338] [1.972,5.178] [0.361,4.014] [0.375,3.917]
γ/ζ 2.769∗∗∗ 3.451∗∗∗ 1.764∗∗∗ 1.845∗∗∗
(0.521) (0.853) (0.801) (0.728)
95% c.i. [1.749,3.790] [1.778,5.123] [0.194,3.334] [0.419,3.271]
/ζ 0.890 0.967∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗ 0.860∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.153) (0.205) (0.195)
95% c.i. [0.582,1.200] [0.665,1.266] [0.404,1.209] [0.477,1.242]
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Appendix A. Identiﬁcation of the Generalized EWA Model
To show that the model parameters are identiﬁed we follow three steps:
we ﬁrst show that the generalized EWA model can be written as a conditional
logit model; then we discuss whether the parameters of the conditional logit
model are identiﬁed. The statistical properties of the maximum likelihood
estimator for the parameters of the conditional logit model are discussed in
McFadden (1974) who presents necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the
existence of a maximum (Lemma 3) and its uniqueness. As in McFadden
(1974), we derive the ﬁrst order conditions (FOC) for maximum likelihood
(ML) estimation and compute the second order derivatives. We discuss what
type of variation in the data is required for the ML-FOC not to be triv-
ially met. Finally we discuss the link between the conditional logit models
parameters and the parameters of the generalized EWA model.
In the main text, we also discuss the empirical identiﬁcation by checking
non-singularity of the estimated information matrix (Skrondal and Rabe-
Hesketh, 2004, chpt. 5). Empirical identiﬁcation (EI) is based on properties
of the estimated parameters rather than the theoretical reduced form param-
eters. Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2004) stress that EI has some advantages
compared to the analytical method: i) it can be based on the estimated in-
formation matrix, a natural byproduct of maximum likelihood estimation;
ii) it assesses identiﬁcation where it matters, i.e. at parameter estimates; iii)
it addresses problems inherent in the sample on which inferences must be
based. In our sample, the estimated information matrix is non-singular in
both the full sample and in all the sub-samples considered.
There are two main diﬀerences between the standard EWA model and
1
our generalized EWA model: ﬁrst, we use the version of the generalized
EWA model that incorporates self-tuning (Ho et al., 2007); second we use a
diﬀerent deﬁnition of the attraction updating rule. As discussed in Section
4.4 in the main text, the updating rule in the generalized EWA is
Aji (t) = N(t)
−1[φi(t)N(t− 1)Aji (t− 1) + αI(sji , si(t))pii(sji , s−i(t))+
+ βdji,BRC(t)pi
j
i,BRC(t) + γd
j
i,PC(t)pi
j
i,PC(t)+
+ 
∑
h6=i
dji,h(t)bi,h(t− 1)piji,imit(t)+
+ ζ
∑
h6=i
dji,h(t)(1− bi,h(t− 1))piji,imit(t)]
This generalized version of the updating rule diﬀers from standard EWA in
the following: i) hypothesized payoﬀs do not play any role but only observed
forgone payoﬀs matter; ii) terms associated with the information acquisition
behavior are added.
To discuss the identiﬁcation of the model parameters it is useful to re-
write the updating rule as function of the initial attractions Aji1. To simplify
notation, consider the re-parametrization below
Aji (t) = x
0
itA
j
i (t− 1) +
5∑
k=1
θkx
kj
it
where
x0it = φi(t)
N(t−1)
N(t)
x1jit =
I(sji ,si(t))pii(s
j
i ,s−i(t))
N(t)
and θ1 ≡ α using Section 4.4 notation
x2jit =
dji,BRC(t)pi
j
i,BRC(t)
N(t)
and θ2 ≡ β using Section 4.4 notation
2
x3jit =
dji,PC(t)pi
j
i,PC(t)
N(t)
and θ3 ≡ γ using Section 4.4 notation
x4jit =
∑
h 6=i d
j
i,h(t)bi,h(t−1)piji,imit(t)
N(t)
and θ4 ≡  using Section 4.4 notation
x5jit =
∑
h 6=i d
j
i,h(t)(1−bi,h(t−1))piji,imit(t)
N(t)
and θ5 = ζ using Section 4.4 notation.
By backward substitution, for t ≥ 2, we get
Aji (t) = A
j
i (1)
t∏
s=2
x0is +
5∑
k=1
θk(
t−1∑
s=2
(xkjis
t∏
l=s+1
x0il) + x
kj
it ) (A.1)
where Aji1 is the initial attraction for strategy j for individual i.
1
We set N(0) = 1, Si(1) = 1 ∀i; as a consequence, φi(1) = 12 , N(1) = 32 , as
explained in Section 4.4. We also need to describe the equation for ﬁrst period
attractions Aji (1): since before the experiment starts no participant has any
information on the game and the available strategies, we set Aji (0) = 0. In
period 1, no information on past actions and proﬁts of group members is
available, hence attractions for period one are only determined by how each
subject used the proﬁt and best reply calculator. Therefore, ﬁrst period
attractions are described as in equation (A.2) below.
Aji (1) = β
dji,BRC(1)pi
j
i,BRC(1)
N(1)
+ γ
dji,PC(1)pi
j
i,PC(1)
N(1)
≡ θ2x2ji1 + θ3x3ji1 (A.2)
1Notice that the factor
∏t
s=2 x
0
is is always strictly smaller than 1. To see this, remember
that N(t) = φi(t)N(t − 1) + 1  hence x0it can be rewritten as x0it = 1 − 1N(t)  and
N(t) ≥ 1 ∀t (see footnote 24 in Section 4.4). This implies that the process determining
the attraction is not explosive and initial attractions do not have an increasingly large
inﬂuence through time even if there is some persistence. Indeed, empirical results from
the generalized EWA model are robust to diﬀerent choices for the initial attractions, as
the comparison between the results reported in Section 4.4 and those reported in Bigoni
(2009) shows.
3
Substituting equation (A.2) in equation (A.1), we get
Aji (t) =θ2x
2j
i1
t∏
s=2
x0is + θ3x
3j
i1
t∏
s=2
x0is +
5∑
k=1
θk(
t−1∑
s=2
(xkjis
t∏
l=s+1
x0il) + x
kj
it )
=
3∑
k=2
θk(x
kj
i1
t∏
s=2
x0is +
t−1∑
s=2
(xkjis
t∏
l=s+1
x0il) + x
kj
it )
+
∑
k∈(1,4,5)
θk(
t−1∑
s=2
(xkjis
t∏
l=s+1
x0il) + x
kj
it ) t ≥ 2
Following Camerer and Ho (1999) and Salmon (2001), the probability Pijt
that individual i chooses strategy j at time t can be generally written as
Pijt =
exp(f(Aji (t))∑
j exp(f(A
j
i (t))
(A.3)
with f(·) monotone increasing, i.e. each individual chooses the strategy that
has the highest attraction. The formulation typically adopted is
Pijt =
exp(λAji (t))∑30
j=0 exp(λA
j
i (t))
(A.4)
with the restriction λ > 0.
Following the statistical literature on models for categorical responses we
refer to λAji (t) as the index or linear predictor. In our generalized EWA the
index is
f(Aji (t)) = λA
j
i (t) = λA
j
i1
t∏
s=2
x0is+
5∑
k=1
λθk
(
t−1∑
s=2
xkjis (
t∏
l=s+1
x0il) + x
kj
it
)
t ≥ 2
(A.5)
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and
λAji (1)
t∏
s=2
x0is = λβ
dji,BRC(1)pi
j
i,BRC(1)
N(1)
t∏
s=2
x0is + λγ
dji,PC(1)pi
j
i,PC(1)
N(1)
t∏
s=2
x0is
= λβx2ji1
t∏
s=2
x0is + λγx
3j
i1
t∏
s=2
x0is
= λθ2x
2j
i1
t∏
s=2
x0is + λθ3x
3j
i1
t∏
s=2
x0is
(A.6)
The likelihood for sample (yijt)i=1,...,N ;t=2,...,40;j=0,...,30 is:
L(λ, α, β, γ, , ζ) ∝
48∏
i=1
40∏
t=2
30∏
j=0
P
yijt
ijt (A.7)
where yijt are binary indicators that take the value 1 if individual i at time
t chooses strategy j and 0 otherwise. A convenient re-parametrization of
the model to discuss parameters identiﬁcation is τ0 = λ and τk = λθk, k =
1, 2, . . . , 5.2 The log-likelihood corresponding to equation (A.7) becomes
l(τ) = l(τ1, . . . τ5) ∝
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
30∑
j=0
yijtlog(Pijt) (A.8)
Incorporating the expression for the probabilities Pijt in equation (A.4), we
2The model log-likelihood function can be written as a function of τk, k = 1, 2, . . . , 5.
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get
l(τ) ∝
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
30∑
j=0
yijtlog
(
exp(λAji (t))∑30
l=0 exp(λA
l
i(t))
)
=
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
30∑
j=0
yijt
(
λAji (t)− log
( 30∑
l=0
exp
(
λAli(t)
)))
=
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
30∑
j=0
yijtλA
j
i (t)−
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
(
30∑
j=0
yijt)log
( 30∑
l=0
exp
(
λAli(t)
))
=
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
30∑
j=0
yijtλA
j
i (t)−
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
1 · log
( 30∑
j=0
exp
(
λAli(t)
))
where the linear predictors λAji (t) are given by equations (A.5) and (A.6).
The statistical properties of the maximum likelihood estimator for the
parameters τk, k = 1, 2, . . . , 5 are discussed in McFadden (1974) who presents
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a maximum (Lemma 3)
and its uniqueness. We now show that diﬀerentiation of the log-likelihood for
our model yields conditions analogous to equation (19) and (20) in McFadden
(1974).
Substituting the expression of the linear predictors λAji (t) in the log-
likelihood, we get
l(τ) ∝
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
30∑
j=0
yijt
(
(τ2x
2j
i1 + τ3x
3j
i1 )
t∏
s=2
x0is +
5∑
k=1
τk
( t−1∑
s=2
xkjis (
t∏
l=s+1
x0il) + x
kj
it
))
−
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
log
(
30∑
j=0
exp
(
(τ2x
2j
i1 + τ3x
3j
i1 )
t∏
s=2
x0is +
5∑
k=1
τk
( t−1∑
s=2
xkjis (
t∏
l=s+1
x0il) + x
kj
it
)))
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Let
• ∂λAji (t)
∂τk
= (
∑t−1
s=2 x
kj
is
∏t
l=s+1 x
0
il + x
kj
it ) ≡ wkjit , k = 1, 4, 5
• ∂λAji (t)
∂τk
=
∑t−1
s=1 x
kj
is
∏t
l=s+1 x
0
il + x
kj
it ≡ zkjit , k = 2, 3
• w¯kit ≡
∑30
j=0 Pijtw
kj
it
• z¯kit ≡
∑30
j=0 Pijtz
kj
it
As a consequence, we can write
• ∂Pijt
∂τk
= Pijt(w
kj
it − w¯kit), k = 1, 4, 5
• ∂Pijt
∂τk
= Pijt(z
kj
it − z¯kit), k = 2, 3
The ﬁrst derivatives of the log-likelihood function are:
∂l(τ)
∂τk
=
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
30∑
j=0
yijtz
kj
it −
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
1(∑30
j=0 exp
(
(τ2x
2j
i1 + τ3x
3j
i1 )
∏t
s=2 x
0
is +
∑5
k=1 τkw
kj
it
))
·
( 30∑
j=0
exp
(
(τ2x
2j
i1 + τ3x
3j
i1 )
t∏
s=2
x0is +
5∑
k=1
τ5w
kj
it
)
zktij
))
=
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
30∑
j=0
yijtz
kj
it −
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
30∑
j=0
Pijtz
kj
it =
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
30∑
j=0
(
(yijt − Pijt)zkjit
)
k = 2, 3
exploiting the deﬁnition of Pijt; similarly
∂l(τ)
∂τk
=
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
30∑
j=0
(yijt − Pijt)wkjit k = 1, 4, 5
The derivatives above are analogous to those in equation (19) in McFadden
(1974).
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The second order derivatives are
∂2l(τ)
∂τk∂τk
=−
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
30∑
j=0
wkjit
(
Pijt
(
wkjit − w¯kit
))
= −
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
30∑
j=0
Pijt
(
wkjit − w¯kit
)2
k = 1, 4, 5
where the last equality follows from the fact that
∑
j Pijt(w¯
k
it)
2 =
∑
j Pijtw
kj
it w¯
k
it.
∂2l(τ)
∂τk∂τk
= −
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
30∑
j=0
zkjit
(
Pijt
(
zkjit − z¯kit
))
= −
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
30∑
j=0
Pijt
(
zkjit − z¯kit
)2
k = 2, 3
where the last equality follows from the fact that
∑
j Pijt(z¯
k
it)
2 =
∑
j Pijtz
kj
it z¯
k
it.
∂2l(τ)
∂τl∂τk
=
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
( 30∑
j=0
wkjit Pijt(z
lj
il − z¯lit)
)
= −
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
(( 30∑
j=0
zljitPijtw
kj
it
)− w¯kitz¯lit)
and
∂2l(τ)
∂τk∂τl
=
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
( 30∑
j=0
zljitPijt(w
kj
it − w¯kit)
)
= −
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
(( 30∑
j=0
zljitPijtw
kj
it
)− w¯kitz¯lit).
Hence, the matrix of the second order derivatives is symmetric.
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∂2l(τ)
∂τl∂τk
=
∂2l(τ)
∂τk∂τl
= −
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
(( 30∑
j=0
zljitPijtw
kj
it
)− w¯kitz¯lit)
= −
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
(( 30∑
j=0
zljitPijtw
kj
it
)− (( 30∑
j=0
zljitPijt
)( 30∑
j=0
wkjit Pijt
)) · 1
+
( 30∑
j=0
zljitPijt
)( 30∑
j=0
wkjit Pijt
)− ( 30∑
j=0
zljitPijt
)( 30∑
j=0
wkjit Pijt
))
= −
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
(
(
30∑
j=0
zljitPijtw
kj
it )−
(
(
30∑
j=0
zljitPijt)(
30∑
j=0
wkjit Pijt)
)
·
30∑
j=0
Pijt
+
( 30∑
j=0
zljitPijt
)( 30∑
j=0
wkjit Pijt
)− ( 30∑
j=0
zljitPijt
)( 30∑
j=0
wkjit Pijt
))
= −
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
30∑
j=0
Pijt
(
zlji1w
kj
it − zljit w¯kit − z¯litwjkit + w¯kitz¯lit
)
= −
48∑
i=1
40∑
t=2
30∑
j=0
(zljit − z¯lit)Pijt(wkjit − w¯kit)
These derivatives are analogous to equation (20) in McFadden (1974). The
matrix of the second order derivatives is the negative of a weighted moment
matrix of the independent variables and thus is negative semideﬁnite. It
follows that the log-likelihood function is concave in τ . The necessary and
suﬃcient condition for the matrix of the second order derivatives to be neg-
ative deﬁnite (Axiom 5 in McFadden, 1974) is expected to hold in our case
because the order condition is satisﬁed (i.e. number of observations larger to
the number of parameters) and the data vary across alternative sets and are
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not collinear.3
The properties of the estimator thus follow from McFadden (1974). More
speciﬁcally, in our case, existence is guaranteed by the fact that: i) the order
condition is satisﬁed; ii) the data vary across alternative sets and are not
collinear; iii) the sample size is large, thus the probability that Axiom 6
(McFadden, 1974) fails approaches zero.
While λ is not identiﬁed, provided that there is enough variability in the
data, we can identify all the parameters that appear in the model likelihood,
namely τ1 = λα τ2 = λβ, . . . τ5 = λζ. Under the assumption that λ 6= 0,
the ratio between these parameters is informative on the relative strength of
each component in determining the attraction of strategy j.
3This is conﬁrmed by the fact that we can show non-singularity of the estimated infor-
mation matrix (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004, chpt. 5). We also changed the initial
conditions for maximum likelihood estimation over the interval [-5,5] for all τ parame-
ters: maximum likelihood estimates are unaﬀected. Descriptive statistics on the variables
zkjit , w
kj
it suggest that the within-subject, within-period variability is substantial, even if it
decreases between period 2 and period 40.
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Appendix B. Instructions
Welcome to this experiment about decision making in a market. The
experiment is expected to last for about 1 hour and 15 minutes. You will be
paid a minimum of 4 Euro for your participation. In addition to this, you
can earn up to 20 Euro if you make good decisions.
We will ﬁrst read the instructions aloud. Then you will have time to read
them on your own. If you have questions, raise your hand and you will be
helped privately. From now on, you are requested not to communicate with
other participants in any way.
Your task. During this experiment, you will be asked to act as the manager
of a ﬁrm which produces and sells a given product: your task consists of
deciding how many product units to put on the market in every period.
Your ﬁrm has three competitors that sell on the same market a product
which is exactly identical to yours. Your competitors are three from among
the participants in the experiment taking place today in this room, but you
will not have the opportunity to discover who they are, not even at the end
of the game. Your identity will be kept secret as well.
The experiment consists of 40 consecutive periods. In every period, you
will be asked to choose how many units to produce (between 0 and 30), and
the same will be done by your competitors. Your choices aﬀect both your
ﬁrm's proﬁts and those of your three competitors.
Every period lasts 30 seconds: if in a period you fail to make your
choice within the time limit, the computer will automatically set the number
of units produced by your ﬁrm in that period equal to 0, and your proﬁt in
that period will be equal to 0 too.
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Price, costs and proﬁts. The market price at which you will be able to sell
your product will be the higher, the smaller the total number of product
units your ﬁrm and your competitors put on the market; if the total number
of product units sold on the market is suﬃciently high, the price will be equal
to zero.
No product unit remains unsold: all the product units you put on the
market will be purchased by consumers at the market price.
To produce, you will have to bear a production cost which will be the
higher, the more product units you put on the market.
Your proﬁt will be equal to the market price times the number of units
you sell, minus production costs.
Earnings and Payment. You will receive an initial endowment of 2000 points.
At the end of each period, your per-period proﬁts or your possible losses will
be added to your total proﬁt, which will always be displayed in the top-right
corner of the screen. Notice that your total proﬁt cannot become negative.
At the end of the game, your total proﬁt will be converted in Euros,
according to the rate:
1000 points = 1 Euro
The corresponding amount of money will be payed to you in cash, privately,
at the end of the session. Remember that, in addition, you will be payed 4
Euros for your participation.
Information at your disposal. At the top of your computer screen you can
read:
1. the number of periods elapsed since the game began (top left corner)
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2. your total proﬁt (top right corner)
3. the number of seconds (top, center) you still have at your disposal to
take a decision. Remember that every period lasts 30 seconds, and if
you do not take a decision in time it will be as if you decided to produce
0 units and in that period your proﬁt will be equal to 0.
Before choosing how many units to produce, you will have the opportunity
to look at some information on market characteristics and on what happened
in the previous periods.
In particular, in every period following the ﬁrst one, you will be informed
about the proﬁts obtained in the previous period by your ﬁrm and by your
competitors. Moreover, you will be able to get more information about:
1. the quantity produced in the previous period by each of your competi-
tors;
2. the quantities produced and the proﬁts obtained by your ﬁrm in each of
the previous periods: this information will be displayed both by means
of a plot and in a table;
3. the quantity produced on the whole by each of your three competitors
in the previous periods: this information will also be presented both
by means of a plot and in a table.
In addition, you will have the opportunity to use a proﬁt calculator, a
device you can use to better understand how the market works. The proﬁt
calculator has two functions:
1. to evaluate your proﬁt, given the number of units produced by your ﬁrm
and the number of units produced on the whole by your competitors.
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2. to evaluate the maximum proﬁt you could earn  and the number of
units your ﬁrm should produce in order to get such proﬁt  given the
number of units produced on the whole by your competitors.
Progress of the experiment. When the reading of these instructions is over,
you will have the opportunity to ask for clariﬁcations about the aspects of
the experiments which are unclear.
When we have answered all possible questions you will be asked to com-
plete a test on your computer, which will allow us to check that you have
fully understood the instructions, and give you the opportunity to get to
grips with the software used in this experiment. The answers you give in this
test will not aﬀect your earnings in any way, nor they will inﬂuence any other
aspect of the experiment. During the test, you will still have the opportunity
to ask questions, as always by raising your hand.
When all the participants have completed their test, the real experiment
will begin. The computer will randomly generate groups of four people; every
participant in the experiment will belong to one and only one group during
the whole experiment. The other three members of the group you belong to
are your competitors, who then remain the same over all the 40 periods of
the game.
Every period lasts at most 30 seconds. The maximum length of the game
therefore is approximately 20 minutes.
At the end of the fortieth period the game will end, and the points scored
by each of the participants will be converted into Euros.
Before being paid privately, you will be asked to answer a short ques-
tionnaire about the experiment, and you will be obliged to hand back the
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instructions.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS EXPERI-
MENT AND GOOD LUCK!
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Appendix C. Graphical Interface
Figure C.1: Graphical interface
Translation. From top to button, left to right. [ ] indicate a button.
bar at the top: period 13 out of 40, remaining time [sec.]: 13, total proﬁt:
3097
box at the top: how many units do you want to produce in this period?
[OK]
ﬁrst box on the left: Proﬁts in the previous period
your proﬁt: 252
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competitor 1: 168
competitor 2: 392
competitor 3: 644
second box on the left: # of units produced in the previous period.
To know the number of units produced in the previous period by one
of your competitors, push the corresponding button. [competitor 1]
[competitor 2] [competitor 3]
center-right box: before taking a decision, you can look at the information
at your disposal and use the proﬁt calculator.
bottom-left box: history of play
# of units you produced and proﬁts you obtained in the previous
periods [show]
# of units produced on the whole by your three competitors in the
previous periods [show]
bottom-right box: proﬁt calculator
do you want to use the proﬁt calculator? [yes]
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